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Exploring and Expanding the One-Pixel Attack
Umair Khan, Walt Woods, Christof Teuscher
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
1. Introduction

2. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)

3. The One-Pixel Attack

In machine learning research, adversarial examples are normal
inputs to a classiﬁer that have been speciﬁcally perturbed to
cause the model to misclassify the input. Recent work has
demonstrated that several image-classifying deep neural
networks (DNNs) can be reliably fooled with the modiﬁcation
of single pixel in the input image -- a technique referred to as
the "one-pixel attack".
We present data on three avenues of exploration into the attack
and consider future research directions:
(i) a modiﬁcation in technique which produces lower attack
RMSE
(ii) a comparison of the attack across diﬀerent networks
(iii) an analysis of the attack via the generation of per-pixel
heatmaps for input images

▪ Technique initially described by J. Su, D.V. Vargas, and K. Sakurai in 2017 [1].
▪ Causes convolutional neural networks to misclassify input images by perturbing
just one pixel in the input image (Figure 2).
▪ Perturbations are encoded as ﬁve-element vectors (x, y, R, G, B) where the
ﬁrst two elements denote position and the last three encode a color value.
▪ Attacks are generated using a genetic algorithm known as diﬀerential evolution
(Figure 3), though crossover is omitted.
Figure 1 -- The basic architecture of a convolutional neural network.
[Image by Raghav Prabhu, medium.com/@RaghavPrabhu. Colors have been modiﬁed.]

randomly initialize 400 perturbations and calculate ﬁtnesses

▪ Commonly used for image classiﬁcation tasks.
▪ Build on basic neural networks by arranging neurons in three "spatial"

create 400 child solutions using xnew = x1 + 0.5(x2 - x3)

dimensions -- height, width, and depth.
▪ Each grouping of neurons in the same three-dimensional "space" represents
a convolution -- in this context, a mathematical operation on a matrix using
another matrix (kernel) that results in a new "feature map".
▪ Through training, these convolutional layers can "learn" features that
determine the classiﬁcation of an image (e.g. eyes, tires, etc).

calculate each child's ﬁtness -- if it is better than its parent's, replace the parent

Figure 3 -- A ﬂowchart
describing diﬀerential
evolution. Fitness is deﬁned
as the conﬁdence in the
correct label; x1, x2, and
x3 are randomly selected

repeat 100x, treating the updated population as the parent population

members of the parent
population.

Figure 2 -- A demonstration of the attack.
[Image from [1].]

4. Results

the perturbation with the best ﬁtness is the "winner"

5. Conclusions

(i)
Table 1 -- A summary of the attack improvement based on the
new ﬁtness function. The mean attack RMSE (averaged

▪ First and foremost, the data veriﬁes the validity of the one-pixel technique -convolutional networks are susceptible to attack with minimal perturbation.
▪ The characteristics of a network have a signiﬁcant impact on the attack,
both in terms of attack success rate and RMSE.
▪ Diﬀerential evolution is clearly not maximizing the potential of the
one-pixel theory -- there are many cases where per-pixel analysis shows
a high attack potential but diﬀerential evolution fails to optimize to the
best solution.
▪ With this in mind, there are a couple of avenues for future exploration:

(iii)

across 500 images) dropped by 19.5% while the success rate
improved slightly.

(ii)

(1) Can we further improve the success of the one-pixel attack by investgating
when and why diﬀerential evolution fails and addressing those problems?
Or is a new search algorithm necessary?
(2) How can we apply the one-pixel attack to other domains where machine
learning is used (e.g. video applications)?
Table 2 -- A summary of the attack performance across CNNs of varying depth. Both the success rate and
the mean attack RMSE decreased as networks deepened. Interestingly, RMSE is signiﬁcantly lower
for networks with a residual architecture compared to those without.

(i) ▪ A common metric used to quantify the "eﬀect" of an
adversarial attack is the root-mean-squared error (RMSE).
▪ In this context, deﬁned as:
▪ Flatten the 32x32x3 image into 1x3072, and take the
average squared diﬀerence between the original and new
pixel -- since only one pixel is changed here, only three
diﬀerences are summed, one for each color channel.
▪ The original ﬁtness function was simply the conﬁdence
of the network in the correct label [1], which did not take
RMSE into account -- we revised the function to do so:

(ii) ▪ The original paper attacks several networks [1], but all

Figure 4 -- Examples of per-pixel heatmaps on various images (Basic network). Four
general cases are described along two axes: successful/unsuccessful attack and
eﬀective/ineﬀective pixel. Examples of all cases are seen in all networks.

(iii) ▪ To analyze the basis of the one-pixel attack and cross-

of them are of similar depth.
▪ To see how the attack performed against networks of
varying depth, we implemented and attacked four

check the performance of DE, we generated per-pixel
heatmaps of input images (Figure 4).
▪ At each pixel, 64 diﬀerent color perturbations were

diﬀerent convolutional networks ranging from 2-14
layers deep (Table 2).
▪ Basic: very simple two-convolution network.
▪ ResNet8: eight-layer implementation of the ResNet

applied and the maximum conﬁdence change recorded
on the heatmap.
▪ The majority of images are sensitive in at least one region.
▪ Four conclusions informed by the four rows of Figure 4:

architecture [2], which utilizes "residual blocks" to
increase accuracy.
▪ AllConv: essentially an upscaled version of Basic [3].
▪ ResNet14: 14-layer version of ResNet architecture.
▪ Though Basic is most vulnerable, other networks
have signiﬁcanly lower average RMSEs.

(1) Some images are vulnerable in many areas. (ﬁrst row)
(2) Some images need very little perturbation. (second row)
(3) Diﬀerential evolution does not always ﬁnd the most
eﬀective color. (third row)
(4) Diﬀerential evolution does not always ﬁnd the most
eﬀective pixel to attack. (fourth row)
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